Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium: Manipulable residual demand by Prabal Roy Chowdhury









Prabal Roy Chowdhury 
 
Discussion Paper 04-15 
 








Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi  
Planning Unit 
7 S.J.S. Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi 110 016, India Bertrand-Edgeworth Equilibrium: Manipulable Residual Demand
Prabal Roy Chowdhury
(Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Center)
First Version, January, 2000
Revised, May, 2004
Abstract: In this paper we seek to provide a resolution of the Edgeworth
paradox for the case where ﬁrms are free to supply less than the quantity
demanded, the residual demand function is manipulable (a generalization of
the proportional one) and prices vary over a grid. We demonstrate that a
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The Edgeworth paradox [15] is an important foundational problem in the
theory of price competition. In a model of Bertrand duopoly where the
ﬁrms are free to supply less than the quantity demanded, Edgeworth [15]
argues that equilibria in pure strategies generally do not exist.1 In this
paper we seek to provide a resolution of the Edgeworth paradox for the case
where ﬁrms are free to supply less than the quantity demanded, the residual
demand function is a generalization of the proportional one and prices vary
over a grid.
There are alternative ways of modeling a game of price competition. In
this paper we examine the case where the ﬁrms make their price and output
decisions simultaneously,2 as well as the case where the ﬁrms produce to
order, i.e. they ﬁrst simultaneously decide on their price levels and then on
their output levels.3 Alternatively, one can assume that ﬁrms ﬁrst decide
on their output levels and then on their prices.4 In this paper, however, we
do not examine this framework.
We examine a class of demand functions which we call manipulable. We
say that a residual demand function is manipulable if, by increasing its
output level, a ﬁrm can increase the residual demand coming to it. An ex-
ample would be the proportional residual demand function, while a counter-
example would be the parallel residual demand function.5
1Dixon [11], as well as Friedman [16] provide formal statements of the problem.
2This framework has been examined, among others, by Dixon [11], Maskin [22] and
Shubik [30,31]. Allen and Hellwig [1] and Vives [34] also use a similar framework for
capacity constrained ﬁrms.
3Papers in this framework include Dixon [12].
4See, for example, Davidson and Deneckere [9] and Kreps and Scheinkman [19].
5In a companion paper we examine the case where the demand function is non-
manipulable, i.e. where a ﬁrm cannot increase the demand coming to it by increasing its
level of output (see P. Roy Chowdhury, Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria: Non-manipulable
residual demand, mimeo, Jawaharlal Nehru University (2001)).
1Moreover, we assume that the price level varies over a grid, where the
size of the grid can be arbitrarily small. There are two reasons why, under
price competition, a pure strategy equilibrium may not exist. The ﬁrst
reason has to do with the well known open-set problem. The second one
is more substantial in nature. Consider some price quantity conﬁguration
that is a candidate for being an equilibrium. With few ﬁrms in the market,
the ﬁrms may not supply the whole of the demand coming to them, but
produce at a level such that price equals marginal cost. However, if price
does equal marginal cost, then it is proﬁtable for the ﬁrms to increase their
price. But this means that the proposed price quantity conﬁguration cannot
be an equilibrium. The grid assumption allows us to side-step the open set
problem, and focus on the second problem, which in our view is the essential
Edgeworth paradox. This assumption can also be motivated by appealing to
the fact that there are minimum currency denominations, or to the practice
of integer pricing.6
We now brieﬂy summarize our results. We demonstrate that if the num-
ber of ﬁrms is large enough, then a unique Nash equilibrium exists. We also
discuss the limit properties of the equilibrium outcome. The ‘folk theorem’
of perfect competition suggests that the perfectly competitive outcome can
be interpreted as the limit of some oligopolistic equilibrium as the number
of ﬁrms becomes large. The interesting question is whether in our frame-
work this is true or not.7 We ﬁnd that in the limit as the grid size becomes
6Some other papers that model such discrete pricing include Dixon [13], Harrington
[18], Maskin and Tirole [23], Ray Chaudhuri [27] and Roy Chowdhury [28]. Harrington
[18] and Maskin and Tirole [23] examine price games with zero costs, while Dixon [13]
examines a game with convex costs and a parallel residual demand function. Both Ray
Chaudhuri [27] and Roy Chowdhury [28] examine price games with decreasing average cost
functions. In models with discretized strategy spaces, Dasgupta and Maskin [6] discuss
the sensitivity of equilibrium outcomes to the size of the grid.
7This question has been thoroughly investigated in the context of Cournot competition.
See, for example, Novshek [24], and Novshek and Sonnenschein [25].
2very small, and the number of ﬁrms becomes very large, the price level
approaches the competitive one and the output level of each ﬁrm becomes
vanishingly small. However, the limiting value of aggregate production, as
the number of ﬁrms goes to inﬁnity, depends on the value of the marginal
cost function at the origin. If this is strictly positive then the limiting value
of aggregate production is ﬁnite. Moreover, as the grid size goes to zero, this
ﬁnite value converges to the competitive demand level. Thus in this case
the ‘folk theorem’ holds. If, however, this value is zero, then in the limit
aggregate production diverges to inﬁnity. In this case the ‘folk theorem’ can
be said to fail.
We then go on to argue that similar results hold even if the cost functions
are asymmetric, or if the ﬁrms play a two stage game, where in stage 1 the
ﬁrms decide on their price, and in stage 2 they decide on their output.
We then relate our paper to the existing literature on Bertrand price
competition.8
One solution to the Edgeworth paradox is to look at mixed strategy equi-
libria. Examples of this approach include Allen and Hellwig [1,2], Dixon [10],
Kreps and Scheinkman [19], Levitan and Shubik [20], Maskin [22], Osborne
and Pitchik [26], Shubik [29,30] and Vives [34].9 Price competition with dif-
ferentiated products has been examined by Benassy [3], Friedman [16] and
Simon [32]. Both Dubey [14] and Simon [31], on the other hand, adopt a
general equilibrium framework to argue that if both buyers and sellers are
strategic, then a pure strategy equilibrium exists. The approach of the two
authors diﬀer, among other things, in the way the rationing rule is modeled.
There is also a large literature that examine models of price competition
where ﬁrms use supply schedules, rather than prices as strategies. We can
8We refer the readers to Vives [35] for a more detailed and succinct summary of the
literature.
9Some of these papers use the ﬁxed point theorems for discontinuous games developed
by Dasgupta and Maskin [6,7].
3mention, among others, Grossman [17] and Mandy [21]. Borgers [4] studies
the outcome if one applies a process of iterated elimination of dominated
strategies in a Bertrand-Edgeworth game.10
In a series of interesting papers Dixon [11,12,13], examines various as-
pects of pure strategy equilibria of Bertrand-Edgeworth games. Dixon [13]
is specially interesting as he also adopts a framework where prices vary dis-
cretely. Dixon [11,12,13], however, proves existence for the parallel residual
demand function (or generalizations thereof) and not for the manipulable
one. Both Dasgupta and Maskin [7] and Maskin [22] prove existence in
mixed strategies for proportional residual demand functions. Allen and
Hellwig [1] studies the nature of such equilibria, as well as their limiting
properties. To the best of our knowledge, however, ours is the only paper
that solves for the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of a Bertrand-Edgeworth
game with manipulable residual demand functions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces and
analyzes the basic model. Section 3 considers some extensions of the basic
model. Section 4 concludes. Finally, proofs of some of the results have been
collected together in the appendix.
2 The Model
There are n identical ﬁrms, all producing the same homogeneous good. The
market demand function is q = d(p) and the common cost function of all
the ﬁrms is c(q).
Throughout we maintain the following assumptions on the demand and
the cost functions.
Assumption 1. d(p) is negatively sloped and intersects the price axis
10Dastidar [8] uses a Bertrand-Chamberlin framework, where ﬁrms have to supply all
demand, to demonstrate that equilibria in pure strategies exist.
4at some price pmax, where 0 < pmax < ∞.
Assumption 2. The cost function c(q) is twice diﬀerentiable, increasing
and strictly convex. Moreover, pmax > c0(0).
We then specify the residual (or the contingent) demand function. Let
Ri(P,Q) denote the residual demand facing the i-th ﬁrm when the price and
the quantity vectors are given by P = {p1,···,pn}, and Q = {q1,···,qn}.
Deﬁne p to be the minimum element in P such that at least some of the
ﬁrms charging this price has a strictly positive output level. Then if the
total production of all ﬁrms charging p is greater than d(p), then we assume
that all ﬁrms who charge a price greater than p obtain no demand, thus
ensuring that Ri(P,Q) is indeed a residual demand function. Moreover, let
the number of ﬁrms charging the price p be m, and let the output vector of
these m ﬁrms be (q1,···,qm). Then the residual demand facing the ﬁrms












j=1 qj > d(p),
(1)
where 0 ≤ γ(qi,
Pm
j6=i qj) ≤ 1.
Notice that if the aggregate production of all the ﬁrms exceed d(p), then
the residual demand coming to the i-th ﬁrm depends on the i-th ﬁrm’s
output, as well as that of the other ﬁrms. In other words, the residual
demand is manipulable via the output level.
We assume that γ(qi,
Pm
j6=i qj) satisﬁes the following assumption.







j6=i qj) are well deﬁned.
(ii) γ1(qi,
Pm
j6=i qj) > 0, γ11(qi,
Pm
j6=i qj) < 0, γ12(qi,
Pm
j6=i qj) < 0 and
γ11(qi,
Pm
j6=i qj) − γ12(qi,
Pm
j6=i qj) < 0.
5(iii) γ1(x,(n−1)x) is decreasing in x. Moreover, limx→0 γ1(x,(n−1)x) =
∞ and limx→∞ γ1(x,(n − 1)x) = 0.
(iv) If limn→∞(n−1)x(n) = L, where L is ﬁnite, then limn→∞ γ1(x(n),(n−
1)x(n)) = 1
L.
(v) If limn→∞(n − 1)x(n) = ∞, then limn→∞ γ1(x(n),(n − 1)x(n)) = 0.
(vi) If limn→∞ x(n) = D, where D > 0, then limn→∞ γ1(x(n),(n −
1)x(n)) = 0.
Note that assumption 3 only imposes restrictions on those ﬁrms who
charge the price p. No restrictions are imposed on those ﬁrms who charge
prices higher than p. In this sense the assumption is quite general.
It is easy to see that the proportional residual demand function satisﬁes








We assume that prices vary over a grid. Our results, however, hold
for any grid size, no matter how small. Thus our analysis is true even if we
approximate the continuous case arbitrarily closely. Deﬁne the set of feasible
prices F = {p0,p1,···}, where p0 = 0, and pi = pi−1 + α, ∀i ∈ {1,2,···},
where α > 0.
The i-th ﬁrm’s strategy consists of simultaneously choosing both a price
pi ∈ F and an output qi ∈ [0,∞). All ﬁrms move simultaneously. We solve
for the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game.
The supply function of a ﬁrm charging a price of p is given by min{c0−1(p),
Ri(P,Q)}.12 Thus we follow Edgeworth [15] in assuming that ﬁrms are free
to supply less than the quantity demanded, rather than Chamberlin [5], who
assumes that ﬁrms meet the whole of the demand coming to them.









qj)2 and γ1(x,(n − 1)x) =
(n−1)
n2x .
12Since the cost function is strictly convex, c
0−1(p) is well deﬁned.
6We then introduce a few more notations.
Let p∗ be the minimum p ∈ F such that p > c0(0).13 In words, p∗ is
the minimum price on the grid which is strictly greater than c0(0). Since
p∗ ∈ F, let p∗ = pj for some integer j.
Moreover, let q∗ = c0−1(p∗) and let n∗ be the smallest possible integer
such that ∀N ≥ n∗,
d(p∗)
N
< c0−1(p∗) = q∗.
Thus if N is greater than n∗, the price is p∗ and all the ﬁrms produce
d(p∗)
N ,
then the market price is strictly greater than marginal costs.
Deﬁne q0(n − 1) as satisfying the following equation:
p∗d(p∗)γ1(q,(n − 1)q) = c0(q). (2)
Thus if the market price is p∗ and all the ﬁrms produce q0(n−1), then, for all
ﬁrms, marginal revenue equals marginal cost. It is easy to see that q0(n−1)
is decreasing in n.14 We are going to argue that for n large, the outcome
where all the ﬁrms charge p∗ and produce q0(n − 1), can be sustained as a
Nash equilibrium.
We then introduce a series of lemmas that we require for our analysis.
The proofs of all the lemmas have been collected together in the appendix.
Lemma 1. limn→∞ p∗d(p∗)γ1(
d(p∗)
n−1 ,d(p∗)) > limn→∞ c0(
d(p∗)
n−1 ).
Given lemma 1, we can deﬁne N1 to be the smallest possible integer such








Lemma 2. ∀n ≥ N1, (n − 1)q0(n − 1) > d(p∗).
13We assume that α is not too large so that p
∗ < p
max.
14Notice that given assumption 3(iii), q
0(n−1) is well deﬁned. That q
0(n−1) is decreasing
in n, follows from Eq. (2) and the fact that γ12 < 0 and γ1(x,nx) is decreasing in x.
7Consider an outcome such that all the ﬁrms charge p∗ and produce q0(n−
1). Then lemma 2 suggests that if n ≥ N1, then the residual demand facing
any ﬁrm that charges a price greater than p∗ would be zero. This follows
since the total production by the other ﬁrms will be enough to meet d(p∗).
Moreover, lemma 2 also implies that ∀n ≥ N1, q0(n − 1) > 0.
Next deﬁne





p∗d(p∗)γ(q,(n∗ − 1)q∗) − c(q), if q > d(p∗) − (n∗ − 1)q∗,
p∗q − c(q), otherwise.
(3)
The interpretation of ˆ π is as follows. Suppose that n∗ of the ﬁrms charge
p∗, and all other ﬁrms charge a higher price. Moreover, out of the n∗ ﬁrms,
(n∗ −1) of the ﬁrms produce q∗ and the remaining ﬁrm produces q. Then ˆ π
denotes the maximum proﬁt that this ﬁrm can earn if it chooses its output
level optimally.
Next consider some pi ∈ F, such that pi > p∗. Let qi satisfy pi = c0(qi).
Let ˆ ni be the minimum integer such that ∀k ≥ ˆ ni,
d(pi)






) < ˆ π.
Lemma 3 below provides an interpretation of ˆ ni.
Lemma 3. If the number of ﬁrms charging pi is greater than or equal
to ˆ ni, then the proﬁt of some of these ﬁrms would be less than ˆ π.
We need a further deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition. N2 =
Pk
i=j+1 ˆ ni + n∗ − 1.
We then argue that for n suﬃciently large, the unique equilibrium in-
volves all ﬁrms charging the price p∗, producing q0(n − 1) and selling
d(p∗)
n .
Proposition 1. Let n ≥ max{N1,N2}. Then the unique equilibrium




Existence. The proof is divided into two steps.
Step 1. Since, from lemma 2, (n−1)q0(n−1) > d(p∗), it is not possible
for any ﬁrm to increase its price and gain, as the deviating ﬁrm will have
no residual demand. Of course, from the deﬁnition of p∗ it follows that
undercutting is not proﬁtable either.
Step 2. We then argue that none of the ﬁrms can change its output
level and gain. Suppose ﬁrm i produces qi, while the other ﬁrms produce
q0(n − 1). Then the proﬁt of the i-th ﬁrm




(qi,q0,p∗) = p∗d(p∗)γ1(qi,(n − 1)q0) − c0(qi). (5)
Observe that the proﬁt function is concave in pi
15 and
∂πi(qi,q0,p∗)
∂qi |qi=0 > 0.16
We then notice that
∂πi(qi,q0,p∗)
∂qi
|qi=q0 = p∗d(p∗)γ1(q0,(n − 1)q0) − c0(q0). (6)
Finally note that setting
∂πi(qi,q0,p∗)
∂qi
|qi=q0 = 0, (7)














0(0) ≤ 0. Then,
c
0(q
0(n − 1)) = p
∗d(p
∗)γ1(q





0(n − 1)) (since γ11 < 0)
≤ c
0(0),
which is a contradiction.
9Uniqueness. The proof is in several steps.
Step 1. We ﬁrst argue that all the ﬁrms must be producing strictly
positive amounts in equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary that ﬁrm i has
an output level of zero. Consider the aggregate output produced by all the
ﬁrms charging p∗.17 Suppose its less than d(p∗).
(i) Let the i-th ﬁrm charge p∗. Since p∗ > c0(0), the proﬁt of ﬁrm i would
increase if it produces a suﬃciently small amount.
(ii) Next consider the case where the total production by the ﬁrms charg-
ing p∗ is greater than d(p∗). Without loss of generality let these ﬁrms be















But this implies that ﬁrm i can increase its output slightly and gain.
Step 2. We then argue that there cannot be some pi (∈ F) > p∗ such
that some ﬁrms charge pi and supply a positive amount.
Suppose to the contrary that such a price exists. This implies that the
total number of ﬁrms charging p∗, say ˜ n, can be at most n∗ − 1. Suppose
not, i.e. let the number of ﬁrms be n∗ or more. Moreover, let the aggregate
production by these ˜ n ﬁrms be less than d(p∗).18 Clearly, all ˜ n ﬁrms must
be producing q∗. (Since there is excess demand at this price, the residual
demand constraint cannot bind, and the output level of all ﬁrms must be
such that price equals marginal cost.) But this implies that total production
17Clearly, all ﬁrms charging prices less than p
∗ would have an output level of zero.
18Of course, if the aggregate production by the ﬁrms is greater than d(p
∗), then the
residual demand at any higher price is zero and we are done.
10is greater than d(p∗). (This follows from the deﬁnition of n∗). But this is a
contradiction.
Now consider some pi > p∗. Clearly, the number of ﬁrms charging p∗ is
less than ˆ ni. Since otherwise some of these ﬁrms would have a proﬁt less
than ˆ π. But they can always ensure a proﬁt of ˆ π by charging p∗. Thus the
total number of ﬁrms producing a strictly positive amount is less than N2,
thus contradicting step 1. Hence all the ﬁrms must be charging p∗.
Step 3. Let ˜ q = (˜ q1,···, ˜ qn), denote the equilibrium output vector.
We ﬁrst establish that the equilibrium output vector must be symmetric.
Suppose not, and without loss of generality let ˜ q2 > ˜ q1 > 0. Then,
∂π1
∂q1
|˜ q = p∗d(p∗)γ1(˜ q1,
X
i6=1









This, however, is a contradiction, since in equilibrium ∂π1
∂q1 |˜ q = 0 = ∂π2
∂q2 |˜ q.
Step 4. Finally, we argue that there cannot be another symmetric
equilibrium where the (common) output level of the ﬁrms is diﬀerent from
q0(n−1). Clearly, in any symmetric equilibrium, the production level of all
the ﬁrms must satisfy Eq. (2). Recall, however, that Eq. (2) has a unique
solution. Hence the claim follows.
Notice that lemma 2 implies that ∀n ≥ N1, nq0(n−1) > d(p∗). Thus this
equilibrium involves excess production. This is interesting as this suggests
that under certain conditions price competition could lead to ineﬃciency.19
The basic idea behind the existence result is quite simple. We demon-
strate that if the number of ﬁrms is large enough, then competition will drive
19In a diﬀerent framework Vives [33] examines the eﬃciency of Bertrand and Cournot
equilibria.
11all the ﬁrms to excess production in an attempt to manipulate the residual
demand. This excess production ensures that if any of the ﬁrms charge a
price greater than p∗, then the residual demand facing this ﬁrm will be zero.
Thus none of the ﬁrms have an incentive to charge a price which is greater
than p∗. Undercutting p∗ is not proﬁtable anyway. Finally we argue that
the quantity decisions are optimal as well.
We then turn to the limit properties of this equilibrium. We need another
lemma before we can proceed.
Lemma 4. limn→∞ q0(n − 1) = 0.
It is easy to see that as the size of the grid becomes small and the number
of ﬁrms becomes large, the equilibrium price approaches the competitive one
and the output level of each ﬁrm becomes vanishingly small (from lemma
4).
Recall, however, that the equilibrium involves excess production. The
next proposition examines whether in the limit aggregate production, nq0(n−
1), approaches the demand level or not.
Proposition 2. (i) If c0(0) = 0, then limn→∞ nq0(n − 1) = ∞.
(ii) If c0(0) > 0, then limn→∞ nq0 = d(p∗)
p∗
c0(0).
Proof. Recall that from lemma 4 it follows that limn→∞ q0(n − 1) = 0.
Hence limn→∞ nq0(n − 1) = limn→∞(n − 1)q0(n − 1). Moreover, from Eq.
(2), assumption 3(ii) and the fact that q0(n−1) is decreasing in n it follows
that (n − 1)q0(n − 1) is increasing in n.20
20Suppose the number of ﬁrms increase from n to n+1, so that q
0(n) < q
0(n−1). Now
suppose to the contrary that (n − 1)q









0(n − 1),(n − 1)q
0(n − 1)) (since γ11,γ12 < 0)
= c
0(q




12(i) Let c0(0) = 0, and suppose to the contrary that limn→∞(n−1)q0(n−
1) = l, where l is ﬁnite. Then
lim





> 0 = c0(0) = lim
n→∞c0(q0(n − 1)),
where the last equality follows from lemma 4. But this contradicts Eq. (2).
(ii) Let c0(0) > 0 and suppose to the contrary that limn→∞(n−1)q0(n−1)
diverges to inﬁnity. In that case
lim
n→∞p∗d(p∗)γ1(q0(n − 1),(n − 1)q0(n − 1)) = lim
n→∞c0(q0(n − 1)),
which, from assumption 3(v) and lemma 4, implies that c0(0) = 0. But this
is a contradiction. Hence let limn→∞(n−1)q0(n−1) = L, where L is ﬁnite.
We can then simply mimic the earlier argument to show that L = d(p∗)
p∗
c0(0).
Thus the limiting behavior of the aggregate production level, nq0(n−1),
depends on the value of c0(0). If c0(0) = 0, then aggregate production
increases without bounds.21 Thus in this case the folk theorem fails to hold.
If, however, c0(0) > 0, then aggregate production converges to d(p∗)
p∗
c0(0).
Note that as α goes to zero this term goes to d(c0(0)). Thus in this case we
can claim that the folk theorem continues to hold.
which contradicts Eq. (2).
21As an example consider the case where the demand function is q = a − p, the cost
function is cq






. It is now straightforward to
demonstrate that the total output
nq







0(n − 1) = ∞.
13In the context of capacity constrained price competition, Allen and Hell-
wig [1] study the limit outcome when the residual demand function is propor-
tional in nature. They ﬁnd that as the market becomes large the equilibrium
prices converge (in distribution) to the competitive price. Note that the lim-
iting procedure adopted in Allen and Hellwig [1] is somewhat diﬀerent from
that in the present paper. Under their approach, not only is the number
of ﬁrms taken to inﬁnity, but moreover, ﬁrm size (i.e. capacity level) is
taken to zero. In contrast we keep the cost function of the ﬁrms unchanged.
Thus we ﬁnd that in order to achieve the competitive outcome ﬁrms are not
necessarily required to be small. This is interesting because perfect compe-
tition is generally motivated in terms of markets with an inﬁnite number of
inﬁnitesimally small ﬁrms.
3 Extensions
In this section we examine some extensions of the basic model.
We ﬁrst examine the case where the cost functions are asymmetric. Let
there be m types of ﬁrms with the cost function of the i-th type being given
by ci(q). Moreover, let c0
1(0) < c0
2(0) < ··· < c0
m(0).
We then introduce a series of notations. Deﬁne p∗∗ as the minimum
p ∈ F such that p > c0
1(0). Next deﬁne n∗
1, q∗
1, q0




manner similar to that of n∗, q∗, q0(n−1), ˆ ni, N1 and N2 respectively, only
taking care to use the cost function of the l-th type, cl(q), instead of c(q).
We are now in a position to write down the next proposition.
Proposition 3. Assume that α < c0
2(0)−c0
1(0) and n1 ≥ max{N1
1,N1
2}.
Then the ‘unique’ equilibrium involves all ﬁrms of type 1 charging p∗∗, pro-
ducing q0
1(n1 − 1) and selling
d(p∗∗)
n1 . The output level of all other ﬁrms is
zero.
Note that the term unique is within quotes since the price charged by
14ﬁrms of type i, where i ≥ 2, is indeterminate.
Finally we examine the case where the ﬁrms play a two stage game where,
in stage 1, all the ﬁrms simultaneously announce prices, and in stage 2, they
simultaneously decide on their output levels. For this case we revert to the
assumption of symmetric costs. We solve for the unique “subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium” of this game.22
Proposition 4. Consider a two stage game where the ﬁrms ﬁrst an-
nounce prices, and then their output levels. Let n ≥ max{N1+1,N2}. Then
the following strategies constitute a unique “subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium”:
Stage 1. All ﬁrms simultaneously announce the price p∗.
Stage 2. Suppose that in stage 1 all ﬁrms announce p∗. Then in stage
2, all ﬁrms produce q0(n − 1), and sell
d(p∗)
n .
Next suppose that in stage 1, (n − 1) of the ﬁrms announce p∗, while
the remaining ﬁrm charges a higher price. Then, in stage 2, all the ﬁrms
charging p∗ produce q0(n − 2) and sell
d(p∗)
n−1 . The other ﬁrm has an output
of zero.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we re-examine the Edgeworth paradox. We demonstrate that
a unique Nash equilibrium exists whenever the residual demand function is
manipulable, prices vary on a grid and there are a large number of ﬁrms.
Interestingly this equilibrium involves excess production. We ﬁnd that as the
grid size goes to zero, and the number of ﬁrms becomes large, the equilibrium
price converges to the competitive one. Depending on the value of c0(0),
however, aggregate production may, or may not converge to the demand
22The term subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is within quotes because we do not solve
for the equilibrium strategies for all possible subgames in stage 2. Whether equilibrium
strategies exist in every subgame is an open question.
15level. Thus whether the folk theorem holds or not depends critically on
c0(0). These results continue to hold even when the ﬁrms are asymmetric,
or produce to order.
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Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose not, i.e. let q0(n − 1) ≤
d(p∗)
n−1 . Observe that








) (since n ≥ N1)




This, however, violates Eq. (2).
Proof of Lemma 3. Let the number of ﬁrms charging pi be k, where
k ≥ ˆ ni. First consider the case where none of the other ﬁrms charge prices
that are less than pi. Clearly, if all the ﬁrms charging pi produce identical





k ≥ ˆ ni, this is less than ˆ π.
Now consider the case where the output level of the ﬁrms charging pi
are not the same. Clearly, if the aggregate production by all such ﬁrms
are less than equal to d(pi), then some of the ﬁrms would be producing
and selling less than
d(pi)




k ) < ˆ π. Whereas, if the aggregate production of such ﬁrms
is greater than d(pi), then some ﬁrms would sell less than
d(pi)
k , while their






17Finally, if some of the other ﬁrms charge less than pi, then the residual
demand at pi would be even less than d(pi). We can now mimic the earlier






Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose to the contrary that limn→∞ q0(n−1) = D,
where D > 0. Then
lim
n→∞ p∗d(p∗)γ1(q0(n − 1),(n − 1)q0(n − 1)) = 0 (from assumption 3(vi))
< c0(D) = lim
n→∞c0(q0(n − 1)).
This, however, violates Eq. (2).
Proof of Proposition 3. The idea of the proof is very similar to that in
Proposition 1.
Existence. Notice that since α < c0
2(0)−c0
1(0), it follows that p∗∗ < c0
i(0),
for all i ≥ 2. Thus no ﬁrm of type j, where j ≥ 2 can proﬁtably charge a
price of p∗∗. For type 1 ﬁrms we can simply mimic the proof in Proposition
1 to claim that they cannot have a proﬁtable deviation.
Uniqueness. The proof is in several steps.
Step 1. We ﬁrst argue that all the ﬁrms of type 1 must be producing
strictly positive amounts in equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary that ﬁrm
i (of type 1) has an output level of zero. Consider the aggregate output
produced by all the ﬁrms charging p∗∗.
(i) Suppose its less than d(p∗∗). Let the i-th ﬁrm charge p∗∗. Since
p∗∗ > c0(0), for a suﬃciently small output level, the proﬁt of ﬁrm i would
increase.
(ii) Next consider the case where the total production by the ﬁrms charg-
ing p∗∗ is greater than d(p∗∗). Without loss of generality let these ﬁrms be















But this implies that ﬁrm i can increase its output slightly and gain.
Step 2. We then argue that there cannot be some pi (∈ F) > p∗∗ such
that some ﬁrms of type 1 charge pi and supply a positive amount.
Suppose to the contrary that such a price exists. This implies that the
total number of type 1 ﬁrms charging p∗∗, say ˜ n, can be at most n∗
1 − 1.
Suppose not, i.e. let the number of such type 1 ﬁrms be n∗
1 or more. In that
case, if the aggregate production by these ˜ n ﬁrms is less than d(p∗∗), then
all ˜ n ﬁrms must be producing q∗
1. But this implies that total production is
greater than d(p∗∗). (This follows from the deﬁnition of n∗
1). But this is a
contradiction.
Now consider some pi > p∗∗. Clearly, the number of type 1 ﬁrms charging
p∗∗ is less than ˆ n1
i. Thus the total number of type 1 ﬁrms producing a strictly
positive amount is less than N1
2, thus contradicting step 1. Hence all ﬁrms
of type 1 must be charging p∗∗.
Step 3. Let ˜ q, denote the equilibrium output vector of type 1 ﬁrms.
We ﬁrst establish that this vector must be symmetric. Suppose not, and




|˜ q = p∗∗d(p∗∗)γ1(˜ q1,
X
i6=1









This, however, is a contradiction, since in equilibrium ∂π1
∂q1 |˜ q = 0 = ∂π2
∂q2 |˜ q.
Step 4. Finally, we argue that there cannot be another symmetric
equilibrium where the (common) output level of the ﬁrms is diﬀerent from
q0
1(n1 − 1). Clearly, in any symmetric equilibrium, the production level of
all the ﬁrms must satisfy
p∗∗d(p∗∗)γ1(q,(n1 − 1)q) = c0
1(q).
It is easy to see that this equation has a unique solution. The argument is
similar to that for the uniqueness of q0(n − 1).
Finally, since type 1 ﬁrms exhaust the demand at p∗∗, the output level
of all ﬁrms of other types must be zero.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Existence.
Stage 2. Notice that n > n−1 ≥ N1. Hence q0(n−1) satisﬁes Eq. (2),
and q0(n − 2) satisﬁes
p∗d(p∗)γ1(q,(n − 2)q) = c0(q).
Hence we can mimic the argument in Proposition 1 to argue that the output
decisions are optimal.
Stage 1. It is easy to see that since n−1 ≥ N1, (n−2)q0(n−2) > d(p∗).
Hence (n − 1)q0(n − 2) > d(p∗). Thus the total production by other ﬁrms
in stage 2, i.e. (n − 1)q0(n − 2), is greater than d(p∗). Hence any ﬁrm that
charges a price greater than p∗ would have a residual demand of zero.
Uniqueness. The proof is in several steps.
Step 1. We ﬁrst argue that all the ﬁrms must be producing strictly
positive amounts in equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary that ﬁrm i has
20an output level of zero. We argue that this ﬁrm can charge p∗, supply a
positive amount and gain. Suppose that ﬁrm i charges p∗.
(i) Following such a strategy, let the aggregate output produced by all
other ﬁrms charging p∗ be less than d(p∗). Since p∗ > c0(0), for a suﬃciently
small output level, the proﬁt of ﬁrm i would increase.
(ii) Next consider the case where the total production by the other ﬁrms
charging p∗ is greater than d(p∗). Without loss of generality let these ﬁrms
be 1,···,m, where m < i, and let q1 > 0. Suppose to the contrary it is















But this implies that ﬁrm i can increase its output slightly and gain.
We can now simply mimic steps 2, 3 and 4 in the uniqueness part of
Proposition 1 to establish uniqueness.
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